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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
WILLIAM HARRISON CLAYTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 17 518 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with one count of murder in 
the second degree, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, S 
76-5-203(1) (b) (1977), for committing an act clearly dangerous 
to human life, while intending to cause serious bodily injury 
to another, which led to the death of John Linde of Provo. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found 
guilty of one count of second degree murder on November 25, 
1980 in the Fourth Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Aflen B. Sorensen, presiding. Appellant was sentenced on 
November 25, 1980 to confinement in the Utah State Prison for 
an indeterminate term of not less than five years to life on 
the one count. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment and sentence of the court below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
John Linde was the victim of a brutal beating which 
eventually led to his death (T. 18). He ·was an elderly 
gentleman who had been seen in good health at 4:00 p.m. on 
November 14, 1979. However, he was discovered semiconscious 
later that same evening in his home around midnight by a 
neighbor, Richard Findley (T. 20, 31). Mr. Linde was lying on 
his bedroom floor moaning and groaning; his teeth had been 
knocked out, his clothes torn, his face beaten, and he was 
coughing up blood (T. 21). Multiple rib fractures were later 
discovered (T. 87). Blood was also found in several of the 
other rooms (T. 21, 53). '!he home had been ransacked (T, 
113). Every drawer, cannister, and book had been strewn about 
and all rooms were in shambles (T. 20, 26, 53, 54). Part of 
the inside unit of the telephone had been removed and 
disconnected (T. 25, 51). A butcher knife was found in a 
bedroom and another located in the living room ( T. 51). Both 
had blood spatters on them (T. 113). 
Mr. Linde died on December 10, 1979 without ever 
recovering sufficiently to communicate with others (T. 41). 
His personal physician who attended him while he was 
-2-
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hospitalized gave his opinion that he would not "have died had 
he not received the beating •••• (T. 42). This opinion was 
corroborated by the medical examiner who performed the autopsy 
(T. 87, 88). 
Among items that Mr. Findley noticed in Mr. Linde's 
home the night of the beating was a yellow baseball-style cap 
(T. 22, 112) (State's Exhibit No. 1). He had seen it earlier 
that evening at about 8 :00 p.m. at Bullock's Billiards worn by 
a "bearded man with long hair • • • an orange vest [and] 
Levis" ( T. 22). He remembered the hat had a bend in the bill 
(T. 23). Although he positively identified the hat, he was 
not certain whether appellant had been the bearded man he had 
seen wearing the hat at the billiard hall (T. 23). Defendant 
was clean-shaven at trial. 
David Robertson, an acquaintance of appellant, 
wrked at Bullock's Billiards and had twice seen appellant on 
t~ evening of November 14, 1979--once at the billiard hall at 
about 7:30 p.m. (T. 102). He said appellant was wearing an 
orange hunting vest or jacket, Levis, and a yellow baseball 
cap (T. 103). He identified the baseball cap found in-the 
victim's home as the same one worn by appellant at the 
billiard hall, noting it had an identical patch with an AHI 
helicoptor on it, and that it had the bill folded to square it 
up (T. 103-105). 
-3-
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Human hairs found on the cap were scientifically 
compared with samples of head hair taken from the appellant 
and were found by James Gaskill, director of the crime 
laboratory at Weber State College, to be consistent and like!) 
to have come from the same person (T. 95). He testified that 
it is difficult to place a specific degree of probabilityon 
the comparison of hair samples, but that studies of others 
indicate the likelihood of two hair samples from two different 
people matching is in excess of ninety-five percent and that 
the studies range up as high as one in forty-five hundred (T. 
96). The defense did not object to Mr. Gaskill's testifyi~ 
to the degree of probability, but did object to his referri~ 
to the studies of others for lack of foundation (T. 96, 
99-100). 
Appellant's sister-in-law, Tony Clayton, testified 
that appellant came to her home late in the evening of 
November 14th or early in the morning of the 15th of November, 
1979, wearing Levis and what she thought was a red shirt (T. 
79, 82). He wanted to speak to his brother (T. 79). She 
testified appellant left some credit cards at her horn~ whkh 
bore the decedent, John Linde's, name (T. 79). She destroyed 
them because she knew they did not belong to the appellant and 
she did not want them in her house (T. 79). 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Appellant's conviction was based solely upon 
circumstantial evidence. The narrow question presented by 
this appeal is whether the trial court properly instructed the 
jury on how it should consider and weigh evidence in a case 
which is totally circumstantial. 
The jury was specifically instructed on 
circumstantial evidence as follows: 
L 
Circumstantial evidence is 
competent, and is to be regarded by the 
jury in all cases. It should have its 
just and fair weight with you; you are 
not to fancy situations or circumstances 
which do not appear in the evidence but 
you are to make those just and reasonable 
inferences from the circumstances proven 
which the guarded judgment of a 
reasonable man would ordinarily make 
under like circumstances; and if in 
connection with the other evidence before 
you, you then have no reasonable doubt as 
to the defendant's guilt, you should 
convict him but if you then entertain 
such doubt, you should acquit him. To 
warrant a conviction on circumstantial 
evidence, each fact necessary to 
establish the guilt of the accused must 
be proven by competent evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt and the facts and 
circumstances proven should not only be 
consistent with the guilt of the accused 
but must be inconsistent with any other 
reasonable hypothesis or conclusion than 
that of guilt. 
-5-
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Jury Instruction No. 9 ( R. 118) .1 The defense objected to 
this instruction at trial on the sole ground that it did not 
advise the jury to regard circumstantial evidence with 
"caution": 
MR. STANGER: We will take exception to 
Instruction No. 9. That is the only one 
we have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You don't wish to.make a 
specification in No. 9 what you claim is 
error? 
MR. STANGER: The thing we have set 
forth, Your Honor, it's our position that 
the Utah cases hold that circumstantial 
evidence is not of the same quality as 
direct evidence, and the jury should so 
be instructed. And that is left out of 
Instruction No. 9. As I recall the case 
it said it should be regarded with 
caution; that I cited for the Court. 
THE COURT: It [Instruction No. 9) says 
"guarded judgment of a reasonable man 
would ordinarily make under like 
circumstances." Then I have the 
reasonable hypothesis. 
That is your only exception? 
MR. STANGER: Yes, sir. (T. 119-20) 
No objection was made to the adequacy of any other aspect of 
Instruction No. 9. 
lThe jury was also given standard instructions on evidence 
including the fact that the State had "the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the 
crime," Instructions Nos. 4, 5, and 10 (R. 113, 114, and 1191; 
the definition of reasonable doubt, Instruction No. 11 (R. 
119); that they should consider the evidence as a whole, 
Instruction No. 12 (R. 120); and that the jury was to 
determine the weight and credibility of the evidence, 
Instruction No. 13 (R. 120). 
-6-
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On appeal, appellant raises an additional objection 
to the instructions given, beyond the single objection he 
preserved at trial. He now asserts that the jury was not 
adequately instructed that in a totally circumstantial 
~idence case such evidence must preclude ev~ry other 
reasonable hypothesis of defendant's innocence. He concedes 
that this subject was addressed in Instruction No. 9, but 
c~ims it should have been covered in a separate specific 
instruction because of its importance. Finally, appellant 
claims that his proposed jury instructions were clearer and 
more accurate on the above two points than the instruction 
given by the Court, and therefore it was error to reject his 
proffered instructions. 2 
At the outset, appellant should be barred from 
raising any claims for the first time on appeal which were not 
properly preserved at trial. It is well recognized in Utah 
that: 
2Note that the record contains two separate sets of 
instructions proposed by the defense and that appellant only 
~furs in his brief to the first set found at R. 91-101 dated 
June 30, 1980. He also submitted a second set of proposed 
instructions on November 24, 1980 found at R. 102-110. 
~spite the fact that these two sets were duplicative in 
sub~tance though worded somewhat differently, the trial court 
;ev1ewed both sets and either rejected them or noted that the 
instructions had been given in substance. 
-7-
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When a party fails to make a proper 
objection to an erroneous instruction; or 
to present to the court a proper request 
to supply any claimed deficiency in the 
instructions, he is thereafter precluded 
from contending error. 
State v. Kazda, Utah, 545 P.2d 190, 193 (1976); State v. 
Kitchen, Utah, 564 P.2d 760 (1977); State v. Gandee, Utah, 5~ 
P.2d 1064 (1978). This rule has been modified by the plain 
error rule which is recognized in many states and in the 
federal courts. The modification allows this Court to review 
an issue for the first time on appeal if there appears to bea 
substantial likelihood that an injustice has resulted. State 
v. Schoenfeld, Utah, 545 P.2d 193 (1976). However, as will be 
shown, no such injustice is present in the instant case. 
Thus, appellant's argument that the jury should have been 
separately instructed on the alternate reasonable hypothesis 
should be summarily rejected. Should this Court choose to 
reach this issue, it is clear the jury was adequately 
instructed on this point. Again, Instruction No. 9 ( R. 1181 
provided in pertinent part that: 
• • • To warrant a conviction on 
circumstantial evidence, each fact 
necessary to establish the guilt of the 
accused must be proven by competent 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and 
the facts and circumstances proven should 
not only be consistent with the guilt of 
the accused but must be inconsistent with 
-8-
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any other reasonable hypothesis or 
conclusion than that of guilt. 
(CT 118). To give a separate instruction on the reasonable 
alternative hypothesis would have been superfluous and 
confusing• 
In any criminal case, 
[t]he prosecutor's burden, ••• whether 
the evidence be direct or circumstantial 
or a combination thereof, is to prove all 
elements of the crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt, whether the defense is 
a denial or an affirmative defense. 
State v. Starks, Utah, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (1981). 
The test whether rejection of a reasonable 
alternative hypothesis instruction is error is set forth in 
State v. King, Utah, 604 P.2d 923 (1979), a case in which the 
appellant argued that the trial court had committed error in 
refusing to give such an instruction. This Court said: 
Of course, the requested instructions may 
make more understandable and explicit the 
usual instruction on burden of proof. We 
cannot say, however, that the 
instructions given in this case 
inadequately informed the jury as to how 
convincing the proof had to be to 
convict • 
.!9_. at 926. This Court also cited State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 
255, 470 P.2d 247 (1970), to the effect that it is a matter 
-9-
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for nthe jury to determine from all the facts and 
circumstances" the guilt or innocence of the accused. Id. at 
247. If the jury is: 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of 
the defendant's guilt, it necessarily 
follows that they regarded the evidence 
as excluding every other reasonable 
hypothesis. 
Id. Therefore, if the instruction "adequately inform(s) .. 
the jury as to how convincing the proof ••• [(has)] • . ~ 
be to convict" (Starks, supra, at 92), the jury in such a case 
has been adequately instructed and no reasonable alternative 
hypothesis instruction is necessary. Accord: State v. Eagle, 
Utah, 611 P.2d 1211 (1981). "Generally, other forms of 
instructions can effectively accomplish the same purpose of 
conveying to the jury the meaning of 'proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt'" (Starks, supra, at 92). 
On the first day of trial the prosecutor advised 
the jury in his opening statement that the evidence in this 
case would be wholly circumstantial and introduced to the jury 
the notion of "every other reasonable hypothesis except 
guilt." 
Now evidence generally speaking, 
just by way of explanation, falls into 
two classes. There is direct evidence, 
which can be explained as similar to an 
eyewitness, someone having seen something 
-10-
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occur, something that points directly 
toward the facts being attempted to be 
proved. Then there is indirect or more 
commonly known as circumstantial 
evidence. These are circumstances. This 
case will be presented to you entirel'f"b'Y 
way of circumstantial evidence. 
Now as I believe the Court's' 
instructions will tell eventually in 
evaluating circumstantial evidence, it 
must exclude every other reasonable 
hypothesis, except guilt. If the 
circumstantial evidence is also 
consistent with innocence, then you must 
find innocence or not guilty. 
(R. 12) {Emphasis added). 
As noted above, the reasonable alternative 
hypothesis theory was included in the jury instruction in this 
case. Had appellant's requested jury instructions been given, 
the result would have been superfluous, repetitive, and 
ambiguous with the risk of confusing the jury. 
Finally, Respondent could not locate, nor did 
~~llant cite, any authority for the proposition that the 
reasonable hypothesis theory must be presented in a separate 
jury instruction as opposed to being part of a general 
iMtruction on circumstantial evidence. 
Appellant's second major contention is that the 
trial court erred in refusing to instruct that circumstantial 
evidence should be viewed with caution. At trial, appellant 
seemed to contend that the word "caution" is a legal term of 
art when used in a jury instruction intended to indicate to 
-11-
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the jury how it is to view circumstantial evidence, and that 
the court's use of the term "guarded judgment" in this case 
was inadequate. 
Appellant bases his notion that the word "caution• 
is required on the following language found in Schad, supra: 
Id. at 247. 
As to point (1): whether the 
evidence justifies the verdict., we survey 
the evidence and any reasonable 
inferences that fairly may be drawn 
therefrom in the light favorable to the 
jury's verdict. However, there are some 
further observations as to the manner in 
which that basic rule is applicable in 
this case. It is true, as the defendant 
contends, that where a conviction is 
based on circumstantial evidence, the 
evidence should be looked upon with 
caution, and that it must exclude every 
reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of 
defendant. This is entirely logical, 
because if the jury believes that there 
is a reasonable hypothesis in the 
evidence consistent with the defendant's 
innocence, there would naturally be a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt, 
Nevertheless, that proposition does not 
apply to each circumstance separately, 
but is a matter within the prerogative of 
the jury to determine from all of the 
facts and circumstances shown; and if 
therefrom they are convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the defendant's 
guilt, it necessarily follows that they 
regarded the evidence as excluding every 
other reasonable hypothesis. Unless upon 
our review of the evidence, and the 
reasonable inferences fairly to be 
deduced therefrom, it appears that there 
is no reasonable basis therein for such a 
conclusion, we should not overturn the 
verdict. 
-12-
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Schad, when read in context, does not stand for the 
proposition that the word "caution" is legally necessary in an 
instruction on circumstantial evidence. The issue this Court 
was addressing involved a general discussion of the test this 
court would apply in determining the sufficiency of the 
evidence to justify a jury verdict. While it is true that 
caution in viewing the evidence in a wholly circumstantial 
case is mentioned, it is nowhere asserted to be a required 
element of a jury instruction. Schad does not even discuss 
jury instructions. Rather, the emphasis is on the rule that 
for evidence to be sufficient to convict in a wholly 
circumstantial case "it must exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis except the guilt of defendant" (Id.). 
That caution is not an essential element either of 
this test or an instruction purporting to convey the standard 
on burden of proof to a jury is further suggested by the fact 
that neither of the cases on which Schad relies for this point 
(People v. Scott, 10 Utah, 217 37 P. 335 (1894), and State v. 
~·Utah, 101 365, 120 P.2d 286 (1932)) mentions "caution." 
Scott and Erwin address only the reasonable hypothesis portion 
of the statement in Schad. 
The Schad progeny on this point reveal only one 
case which even mentions "caution" and that occurs in a direct 
quotation from Schad itself. King, supra, at 926. No 
-13-
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elucidation is given in King, supra, or in any of the cases 
citing Schad as to the inclusion of caution in jury 
instructions on circumstantial evidence. In fact, none of 
these cases, except King, even discusses jury instructions. 
The cases generally cite Schad for the proposition that where 
the evidence is wholly circumstantial every reasonable 
hyPothesis of the defendant's innocence must be excluded 
(State v. Dodge, Utah, 564 P.2d 312, 313 (1977)), and that 
this "is in reality nothing more than another manner of 
stating the burden of proof applicable in all criminal cases, 
viz., beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 
P.2d 229, 232 (1980). Accord: State v. John, Utah, 586 p,~ 
410, 411 (1978). ResPondent found no cases that would suggest 
that the word "caution" is essential in a jury instruction on 
circumstantial evidence. The only cases which shed any light 
on whether a particular jury instruction is required in wholiy 
circumstantial evidence cases are King, supra, and State v. 
Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 P.2d 57 (1960). 
The appellant in King contended the trial court hao 
erred in failing to give his requested "instruction to the 
jury in explaining the effect of reasonable alternatives or 
hyPotheses uPon the burden of proof in a er iminal case.• Id· 
at 926. 
-14-
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After quoting the appellant's requested jury 
instruction and the language from Schad containing the 
'caution" dicta, this Court indicated that if it cannot be 
said the instructions given in a case "inadequately informed 
the jury as to how convincing the proof had to be to commit," 
the fact that "the requested instructions may make more 
@derstandable and explicit the usual instruction on burden of 
~oof" does not mean the rejected instructions are to be 
proffered or that it is reversible error not to give them. 
Id, 
State v. Garcia, supra, cited in a somewhat unclear 
fashion in appellant's brief, provides further guidance on 
this same point. There this Court said: 
It is universally recognized that there 
is no jury question without substantial 
evidence indicating defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This requires 
evidence from which the jury could 
reasonably find defendant guilty of all 
material issues of fact usually with 
reference to the jury instructions, we 
have held that where the only proof of 
material fact or one which is a necessary 
element of defendant's guilt consists of 
circumstantial evidence, such 
circumstances must reasonably preclude 
every reasonable hypothesis of 
defendant's innocence. An instruction to 
this effect in an appropriate situation 
would be proper but this requires care to 
use language which the Jury would 
understand and which would not merely 
lend to their confusion. 
~. supra, at 59, 69 (Emphasis added). 
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Respondent respectfully submits that nowhere has 
this Court indicated that caution is an essential term of art 
to a jury instruction on circumstantial evidence. 
Moreover, respondent submits there is no essential 
distinction between the word "caution" and the term "guarded 
judgment" as used by the court in Jury Instruction Number 9. 
Webster's New International Dictionary of the English 
Language, 2nd Edition, Unabridged, G. & c. Merriam Co., 1934, 
defined "caution" as: 
[a] precept or warning against evil of 
any kind; an exhortation to wariness; 
something, as a word, act, or command, 
that conveys a warning. Synonyms, care, 
forethought, heed, prudence, ~~ 
circumspection, counsel, advise, warning, 
admonition. 
Id. at 428. Similarly, "guarded" is defined as being: 
cautious, wary, circumspect; as, he was 
guarded in his expressions; framed or 
uttered with caution; as, his expressions 
were guarded. Synonyms, discreet, 
watchful, Cf. careful. 
Id. at 1111. "Judgment" is defined as: 
[t]he mental act of judging; the 
operation of the mind, involving 
comparison and discrimination, by which 
knowledge of values and relations is 
mentally formulated; the power of 
arriving at a wise decision or conclusion 
on the basis of indications and 
probabilities, when the facts are not 
clearly ascertained; as, to use your best 
judgment; discretion; discernment; as, a 
man of sound JUdgment. 
Id. at 1343 (Emphasis added). 
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Respondent submits that even taking into account 
"caution" or "guarded judgment" stated in the Schad opinion 
when viewing all the circumstantial evidence and inferences 
therefrom, the test to be applied by this Court on review is 
the same: 
Unless upon our review of the evidence, 
and the reasonable inferences fairly to 
be deduced therefrom, it appears that 
there is no reasonable basis therein for 
such a conclusion, we should not overturn 
the verdict. 
Schad, supra, at 247. 
Respondent submits that in the sense in which it 
was used in Jury Instruction 9 in this case, the term "guarded 
judgment" is the semantic equivalent of "caution" and submits 
that the jury was properly instructed on the law related to 
circumstantial evidence in the instructions given. When those 
instructions are read as a whole, it is evident that they 
contain the correct elements of appellant's proposed jury 
instructions which he alleges were improperly refused by the 
court in the instant case (Appellant's Brief at 4). The 
instructions given represented an accurate understanding of 
the correct principles of law applicable to this case. 
A brief examination of defendant's requested Jury 
Instruction Number 1 which he now claims for the first time 
ws improperly rejected by the trial court indicates why it 
was properly refused. 
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Again, appellant should be precluded from raising 
this issue for the first time on appeal, but should this Couc' 
decide to reach it, it is clear that appellant was not 
prejudiced by rejection of his Jury Instruction Number 1, 
which stated: 
(RT 92). 
You are instructed that 
circumstantial evidence is nec.essarily 
less convincing and of less value than 
direct evidence. Circumstantial evidence 
must be treated with caution. 
This is an erroneous statement of the law. While 
it is true there is dicta to indicate circumstantial evidence 1 
may be of less quality than direct evidence (Schad, supra; 
State v. John, Utah, 586 P.2d 410, 411 (1978)), other 
decisions of this Court indicate this is not the case.3 
Since direct and circumstantial evidence are 
treated the same under the law as regards their probative 
value, they should not be treated differently in jury 
3state v. Housekeeper, Utah, 588 P.2d 139, 140 (1978) 
("Circumstantial evidence may be even more convincing than 
direct testimony."); State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131 P.2d 
805, 807 (1942) (" .•• such evidence may be just as 
conclusive or even more so than direct evidence."); State v. 
Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414, 425 (1939) ("Circumstantial 
evidence alone is enough to support a verdict of guilty of the 
most heinous crime ••• ") (See discussion in State v. 
Wilkins,· 523 P.2d 728, 733-737 (Kans. 1974) ). 
-18-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
instructions. The important and essential element when 
dealing with either form of proof is whether it convinces the 
iury beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. 
If that is the case, any superfluous language commanding one 
type of proof is of less value and should be treated with 
caution could only confuse the jury. 
POINT II 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN ADMITTING THE 
TESTIMONY OR THE EXPERT WITNESS, JAMES 
GASKILL. 
Appellant next contends that the "probability 
testimony regarding hair samples was improperly admitted" 
(Appellant• s Brief at 4) and cites error in two areas. 
'First, there was a lack of foundation for the probability 
evidence and second, such probability evidence had a 
disproportionate impact upon the jury's conclusion" 
(Appellant's Brief at 5). 
Appellant's argument that there was a lack of 
foundation for the expert testimony on probabilities may be 
s~marily disposed of. After Mr. James Gaskill had been 
called and sworn as a witness for the state, the prosecutor 
b~an asking questions to establish his qualifications so that 
he might give expert opinion and testimony (T. 89). Defense 
counsel interjected that he would stipulate to Mr. Gaskill's 
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qualifications (Id.). The court found that stipulation 
I 
adequate to establish Mr. Gaskill as an expert (Id.), and that I 
he was qualified to base his opinion on the studies of others• 
(T. 96). When defense counsel objected (citing lack of 
foundation) to Mr. Gaskill's testimony based on his own 
studies and those of others, the court overruled the objec'tior,j 
based on defense counsel's prior stipula~ion to the witness' I 
qualifications. I 
Speaking generally about the qualifications of a 
witness to testify as an expert, Wigmore indicates: 
The possession of the required 
qualifications by a particular person 
offered as a witness, must be expressly 
shown by the party offering him. This 
follows from the nature of the situation 
••• and is universally conceded •••• 
Second and emphatically, the trial court 
must be left to determine, absolutely and 
without review, the fact of possession of 
the required qualification by a 
particular witness. In most 
jurisdictions it is repeatedly declared 
that the decision upon the experiential 
qualifications of witnesses should be 
left to the determination of the trial 
court. 
2 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 560, 561 (Chadbourn rev. 1979)_. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1953) 
I 
indicates the conditions under which a witness may testify asj 
an expert and says that "[u]nless the judge excludes the 
testimony he shall be deemed to have made the finding 
requisite to its admission." 
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It would seem that where the requirement to show 
qualifications to give expert testimony is obviated by an 
express stipulation by opposing counsel, there is no issue as 
to those qualifications or need for foundation for the opinion 
that may later be expressed. State v. Mason, Utah, 5 30 P. 2d 
795, 798 (1975). 
Appellant should have challenged Mr. Gaskill's 
qualifications during the trial; his assertion of lack of 
foundation for a portion of the expert opinion comes late and 
should be rejected by this Court. 
As to Mr. Gaskill's referring to the studies of 
other knowledgable persons in the field of hair comparison and 
analysis, it must be remembered at the outset that Mr. Gaskill 
did not cite those studies for the truth of the matter 
asserted, i.e., to show that the samples of hair taken from 
the appellant were in fact the same as those found on the cap 
found at the victim's home. Thus the studies to which Mr. 
Gaskill referred would not come under the definition of 
hearsay. 
In Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. 
Cir. 1962) the u.s. Court of Appeals said: 
we agree with the leading commentators 
that the better reasoned authorities 
admit opinion testimony based, in part, 
upon reports of others which are not in 
evidence but which the expert customarily 
relies upon in the practice of his 
profession. 
l9_. at 641. (Citing McCormick, Evidence, § 15 (1955) and l 
~. Evidence, § 688 (3d Ed. 1940) .) Accord: United 
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States v. Morrison, 531 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1976); 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 703. 
In State v. Garrison, 585 P.2d 563 (Ariz. 1978), 
the Arizona Supreme Court said: 
Arizona Rules of Evidence, l 7A A.R.S., 
effective September 1, 1977, provides by 
Rule 803(18) that statements contained in 
published treatises, periodicals, or 
pamphlets on the subject of medicine are 
not excluded by the hearsay rule. 
Id. at 566. In Garrison the error asserted on appeal 
concerned the prejudicial quality of testimony of mathematical 
probabilities given by an expert as to comparisons he had madi 
betwen bite marks found on the victim's corpse and impressions 
made from castings taken of the defendant's teeth. 
Indeed, appellant similarly contends that the 
probability testimony of Mr. Gaskill was erroneously admitted 
because of its alleged prejudicial impact on the jury. 
In examining this claim, it must be observed that 
the testimony offered by Mr. Gaskill was for the purpose of 
corroborating the eyewitness testimony of David Robertson, who 
personally knew appellant and observed him at approximately 
7:30 p.m. on November 14, 1979 (T. 102), the day on which the 
victim was beaten (T. 19). He identified a cap found at t~ 
victim's home (T. 52) as the one he had seen worn by the 
defendant on the early evening of November 14 at Bullock's 
Billiards (T. 105). 
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Additionally, the jury had the testimony of Richard 
Findley to the effect that he observed a "bearded man with 
long hair" wearing the cap at about B: 00 in the evening also 
at Bullock's Billiards ( T. 2 2, 10 2). Two i terns of clothing 
worn by the individual he observed wearing the cap (orange 
vest and Levi trousers) matched items of clothing recalled by 
witness Robertson (T. 103). 
The jury also had before it the testimony of the 
appellant's sister-in-law to the effect that during the late 
evening hours of the 14th of November or early morning hours 
of November 15, 1979, the appellant, dressed in Levis and what 
she thought was a red shirt, came to her home to speak with 
his brother, the witness' husband (T. 79). Appellant 
apparently left some credit cards that had the name of the 
victim, John Linde, embossed on them (T. 79). 
Thus, the only purpose for James Gaskill's expert 
testimony was to provide corroboration that the cap found at 
llie Linde home and seen on appellant's head earlier that 
evening had been worn by appellant ( T. 9 5). 
The test on appeal in Utah for the admission of 
expert opinion testimony is as follows: The reviewing court: 
la) examines the record to determine if there was some basis 
for the testimony given at the trial, and (b) determines if 
the jury had oppcrtunity to weigh the testimony against any 
opposing, mitigating or impeaching testimony or opinion. 
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Where it appears to the trial court that a reasonable 
foundation for the opinion of the expert has been given, it is 
then within the discretion of that court to admit the 
challenged evidence and "allow any frailties therein to be 
exposed by cross-examination." State v. Ward, Utah, 347 P.2d 
865, 868 (1959). 
Id. 
In considering whether such testimony was 
prejudicial error, it is necessary to 
weigh not only the opinion itself but the 
extent to which any existing weaknesses 
therein were so exposed to the jury. The 
faults in it, assailed by the defendant, 
go to its weight rather than to its 
competency. 
This test was met in the instant case. A 
reasonable foundation for the testimony existed because of 
defense counsel's stipulation to the witness' qualifications. 
This was sufficient to establish him as an expert qualified to 
base his opinions on his own studies and those of others (T. 
96). 
Next, the jury had before it admissions on direct 
examination by Mr. Gaskill to the effect that "it [is] very 
difficult to put a specific number on" (T. 96) the "likelihood 
[that the hair from the defendant and hair found on the cap] 
came from the same person" (Id.). 
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On cross-examination, Mr. Gaskill frankly admitted 
the difficulty in assigning a numerical value to the 
probability that two hairs came from the same individual. 
Mditionally, counsel for the appellant brought out several 
areas in his cross-examination of Mr. Gaskill that limit and 
impeach the reliability of giving probabli ty percentages in 
hair similarity cases (T. 96-99). 
As stated by this Court in Ward, supra, any faults 
in the testimony of an expert witness "go to its weight rather 
than to its competency• (Id. at 868). 
Here, the testimony of Mr. Gaskill was by way of 
corroboration, not primary identification. The testimony was 
subject to cross-examination during which negative aspects of 
that testimony were brought to light before the jury, and the 
witness freely admitted the difficulty of assigning a 
percentage of numerical probability to hair comparison cases. 
In State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978), 
cited by appellant for the proposition that statistical 
probabilities are prejudicial, the testimony of the expert was 
directed specifically at the defendant in that case, and the 
probabilities were projections from the specific hairs found 
on the victim as compared with samples taken from the 
defendant Carlson. In the instant case, the expert merely 
testified that: 
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[t]he studies indicate that the 
likelihood of two hair samples from two 
people, two different people matching, is 
way in excess of ninety-five percent. 
The studies range up as high as one in 
forty-five hundred. 
(T. 96). There was no elaboration or attempt by the 
prosecutor to apply any specific percentages or numerical 
quantities to the facts and circumstances of this case, and 
the witness freely admitted the difficulties in making 
statistical comparisons. In answering the question "[M]ay 
expert witnesses express their findings in terms of 
mathematical probabilities?", the court in Carlson found that 
the testimony conveying "the suggestion of mathematical 
precision• (Id. at 176) was improperly received but was 
nonprejudicial because it was cumulative in nature. The 
Carlson court indicated that probability testimony becomes 
prejudicial only when "the odds are based on estimates, the 
validity of which have not been demonstrated." Id., citing 
State v. Sneed, 414 P. 2d 8 58 (New Mexico, 1966). In Carlson, 
supra, the court found that adequate foundation had been laid 
for the expert• s testimony and that the statistics quoted in 
the record were based "upon empirical scientific data of 
unquestioned validity.• Id. 
The error found by the court in U.S. v. Massey, 591i 
I F.2d 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1979), also cited by appellant, was i 
also lack of foundation for the testimony that was admitted, ! 
not the inherent invalidity of the studies or results referrecl 
to. 
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r 
L 
Respondent asserts that appellant in the instant 
case was not prejudiced by the comment made by the expert 
witness concerning studies he had read regarding hair 
comparison. If error was committed, it was not prejudicial. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the admission of the 
testimony was proper and that if error was committed in so 
doing, the error was harmless under the Ward, supra, analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the points and authorities stated above, 
the conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
DATED this 20th day of January, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
~~ 
EARL F. DORI US 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Utah, 84601, this 20th day of January, 1982. 
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